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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jamie Neider appeals from the district court's order denying his "Illegal 
Sentence Motion," in which Neider requested credit toward his sentence for 
discretionary jail time he served as a condition of probation. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2008, Neider pied guilty to burglary. (R., p.41.) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three years fixed, but suspended 
the sentence and placed Neider on probation for five years. (R., pp.41-43, 49-
53.) While on probation, Neider served 332 days of discretionary jail time. (R., 
pp.55, 62.) He thereafter admitted to violating his probation (R., pp.59-69, 71-
75), and the district court revoked his probation, executed his sentence and 
retained jurisdiction (R., pp.76-80, 84-85). Following the retained jurisdiction 
period, the district court suspended the balance of Neider's sentence and 
reinstated him on probation. (R., pp.89-92, 94-103.) Neider again served 
discretionary jail time (R., pp.105-07, 112) and, thereafter, again admitted to 
having violated his probation (R., pp.108-16, 127-28). The district court revoked 
Neider's probation and ordered his sentence executed. (R., pp.129-31, 133-34.) 
On October 20, 2011, Neider filed a motion for credit for time served, 
requesting that the court award him credit toward his sentence for the 
discretionary jail time he served as a condition of probation. (R., pp.135-44.) 
The district court denied the request in an order filed on January 3, 2012. (R., 
1 
pp.145-47.) Neider did not appeal. (See generally R.; see also Tr., p.9, Ls.15-
24.) 
Two years later, on January 2, 2014, Neider filed an "Illegal Sentence 
Motion," again requesting credit toward his sentence for the discretionary jail time 
he served while on probation. (R., pp.148-58.) The district court denied the 
motion, concluding in its written order that Neider "has been properly credited for 
time served, and he is not entitled to credit for the days he served as a condition 
of probation. The court has ruled previously on that issue and no direct appeal 
has ever been taken from that determination, or from the Amended Judgment of 
the court." (R., pp.165-69; see also Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.7, L.2, p.9, Ls.15-23.) 
Neider timely appealed. (R., pp.171-75.) 
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ISSUES 
Neider states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Neider's Illegal 
Sentence Motion? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was Neider barred by the doctrine of res judicata from resurrecting his 
claim - finally decided against him in 2012 - that he was entitled to credit 
toward his sentence for the discretionary jail time he served as a condition 
of probation? 
2. Even if Neider's request for time served was not barred by res judicata, 
has Neider failed to show that the district court erred by declining to give 





Neider Was Barred By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata From Resurrecting His 
Claim - Finally Decided Against Him In 2012 - That He Was Entitled To Credit 
Toward His Sentence For The Discretionary Jail Time He Served As A Condition 
Of Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mindful of statutory provisions and precedent that undercut his claim, and 
mindful of "the fact that the district court previously denied the same request in 
[2012]," Neider nevertheless argues on appeal that the district court erred in 
denying his 2014 request for credit toward his sentence for the discretionary jail 
time he served as a condition of probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-5.) Neider's 
argument fails because his 2014 request for credit for time served was barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The question of whether an action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises free review. State v. 
Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 11 P.3d 481 (2000). 
C. Neider's 2014 Request For Credit For Time Served Was Barred By Res 
Judicata 
The doctrine of res judicata prevents re-litigation of issues that have been 
previously decided in a final judgment or decision in an action between the same 
parties. State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000). As 
found by the district court, and acknowledged by Neider on appeal, the issue of 
whether Neider was entitled to credit toward his sentence for the discretionary jail 
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time he served as a condition of probation was finally decided against Neider in 
2012. (See R., pp.135-44, 145-47, 169; Tr., p.9, Ls.15-23; Appellant's brief, 
pp.1-2, 5.) Neider's 2014 request for credit for time served - which merely 
sought to re-litigate the issue already decided by the district court and never 
appealed by Neider, was thus barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Neider has 
failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court's order denying his 2014 
request for credit for time served. 
11. 
Even If Neider's Request Was Not Barred By Res Judicata, He Has Failed To 
Show That The District Court Erred By Declining To Give Him Credit Toward His 
Sentence For Jail Time He Served As A Condition Of Probation 
A Introduction 
Even if Neider's 2014 request for credit toward his sentence for the 
discretionary jail time he served as a condition of probation was not barred by 
res judicata, Neider has failed to show error in the district court's determination 
that Neider is not entitled to such credit under existing law. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasguez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
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C. Neider Is Not Entitled To Credit Against His Sentence For The Jail Time 
He Served As A Condition Of Probation 
Under Idaho law an inmate is entitled to credit for time served if he is 
incarcerated on that sentence. I.C. § 18-309; Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 
403, 128 P.3d 938, 940 (2006); Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869, 187 P.3d 
1241, 1244 (Ct. App. 2008). He is not entitled to credit for time served if he is 
not incarcerated but is instead on probation or parole. I.C. § 18-309; I.C. § 19-
2603 (time spent "at large under [a] suspended sentence shall not be counted as 
a part of the term of his sentence"); I.C. § 20-209A ("time during which the 
person is voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of 
the board of correction, or from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall 
not be estimated or counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced"); 
Taylor, 145 Idaho at 869, 187 P.3d at 1244 (I.C. § 18-309 "notably does not base 
credit on any factor other than actual incarceration"). Nor is he entitled to credit 
against his sentence for time actually spent incarcerated during his probation if 
such incarceration was imposed as a condition of probation. State v. Dana, 137 
Idaho 6, 8, 43 P.3d 765, 767 (2002). 
Applying these principles, the district court correctly declined Neider's 
request that he receive credit toward his sentence for the discretionary jail time 
he served while on probation because such incarceration was imposed as a 
condition of probation. (R., pp.165-69; Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.8, L.10.) On appeal, 
Neider is "mindful" of the statutory provisions and case law that support the 
district court's ruling. He nevertheless argues in conclusory fashion that (1) "he 
is entitled to credit for discretionary time that he spent in jail as a condition of 
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probation because he was in physical custody and was under the supervision of 
the probation department"; (2) Idaho Code sections 18-309 and 20-228 are 
unconstitutional "because they do not provide for credit for time spent on parole, 
probation, or in jail as a condition of probation"; and (3) "by not giving him credit 
for the time he spent on probation, the district court effectively increased his 
sentence." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Neider has failed to support the first and 
second of these assertions with either cogent argument or legal authority and, as 
such, has waived consideration of them on appeal. See State v. Freitas, 157 
Idaho 257, _, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 257, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)) (declining to address argument as a 
result based on established principle that "[a] party waives an issue on appeal if 
either authority or argument is lacking"). His third assertion - that the denial of 
his motion for credit for the jail time he served as a condition of probation 
"effectively increased his sentence" - is directly contrary to existing law. See 
Dana, 137 Idaho at 8, 43 P.3d at 767 (inmate not entitled to credit toward 
sentence for discretionary jail time served as a condition of probation even if 
service of discretionary jail time results in a period of incarceration that exceeds 
the statutorily authorized maximum sentence). 
Neider is not entitled under existing law to credit toward his sentence for 
the discretionary jail time he served as a condition of probation. Having failed to 
advance any legal justification for departing from existing law, he has failed to 
show the district erred in denying his motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Neider's "Illegal Sentence Motion" that requested credit toward his 
sentence for the discretionary jail time he served as a condition of probation. 
DATED this 31 st day of December 2014. 
I A. FLEMING. 
Deputy Attorney Gener 
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